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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-TAXATION-INTERSTATE

COMMERCE-

TAx-A Pennsylvania corporation sold and delivered coal
from its out-of-state mines to purchasers in New York City. The
city had imposed a two per cent tax' on all sales. made within the
city,2 sale being'defined as the transfer of title, possession, or
both.8 In a suit by the city to collect the tax from the seller it was
held, that the tax is not invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce; it is nondiscriminatory and does not unduly burden such
commerce, for the taxable event is the final transfer of possession
and its only relation to interstate commerce is that the goods
have moved interstate at some previous time. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 343 (1940).
If broadly interpreted, this case may strike down the doctrine
that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation. The tax
here sustained is levied upon the very transfer by which the
property ends its interstate journey and is brought into the state.
Prior to the present case it was generally believed that such taxation of interstate sales was unconstitutional. 4 Since interstate
sales are "interstate commerce in its essence,"' a state that could
tax such sales would have power to stop trade between the states.
SALES

1. The tax was levied under authority of a state statute which authorized the city of New York to impose in the city any tax which the legislature would have power to impose. N. Y. Laws (1933 E.S.) c. 815, as amended
by N. Y. Laws (1934 E.S.) c. 873.
2. The statute specifically included agreements to sell, made and consummated in the city. But the definition of sale seems broad enough to cover
such transactions. N. Y. Local Law 24 of 1934 (published as Local Law
No. 25).
3. The tax was conditioned on the transfer of title or possession within
the city. The duty of collection was imposed on the seller, but the buyer was
also liable for the tax if the seller did not collect. This, in substance, was
the construction adopted by state courts. Matter of Atlas Television Co., Inc.,
273 N.Y. 51, 6 N.E. (2d) 94 (1927); Matter of Merchants Refrigerating Co.
v. Taylor, 275 N.Y. 113, 9 N.E. (2d) 799 (1937); Matter of Kesbec, Inc. v.
McGoldrick, 278 N.Y. 293, 16 N.E. (2d) 288 (1938).
4. The Supreme Court has so assumed in dictum. See Sonneborn Bros.
v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515, 43 S.Ct. 643, 646, 67 L.Ed. 1095, 1100 (1923);
Jacoby, Conflicting Interpretations of Retail Sales Tax Laws (1934) U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 78, 96; Jones, Some Constitutional Limitations on State Sales
Taxes (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 461, 473, 480; Perkins, The Sales Tax and
Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12 N.C.L. Rev. 99. But, In an
article written shortly before the decision of the instant case, the view is
taken that the very tax here sustained might be held constitutional. Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617.
5. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515, 43 S.Ct. 643, 464, 67 L.Ed.
1095, 1100 (1923).
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Insofar as the Court disagrees with that view this case represents at least a further limitation on the already many times
qualified immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation.
Beginning with denial of the full protection of the "original package" doctrine," the Court has permitted state regulation under
guise of exercise of other state powers;7 the state has been allowed to legislate on subjects described as "local" in nature;8 and
measures affecting interstate commerce have been upheld provided that they "only incidentally and indirectly" affect the "intercourse" between the states.9 Under the protection of these
doctrines, property taxes on the instruments employed in the
commerce ° and a tax fairly apportioned to the use within the
state of property also employed elsewhere have been sustained."
Nondiscriminatory taxation of property shipped interstate before
movement begins 2 or after the property has "come to rest"'8 has
6. The court's present attitude toward the doctrine that a state may not
tax goods moved in interstate commerce while they remain in the original
package is summarized in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 5il, 526,
55 S.Ct. 497, 501, 502, 79 L.Ed. 1032, 1040, 1041 (1935). The doctrine originated
in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 436, 6 L.Ed. 678, 684 (1827), but application of it to interstate commerce was refused in Woodruff v. Parham, 75
U.S. 123, 19 L.Ed. 382 (1868). It was, however, used to prevent complete prohibition of the sale of an article. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681,
34 L.Ed. 138 (1889); Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 10 S.Ct. 725, 34 L.Ed.
150 (1889). And it could not be used to evade state regulation. Austin v.
Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 LEd. 224 (1900). A summary of the
cases in American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 521, 245 S.Ct. 365,
371, 48 L.Ed. 538, 546 (1903) states that they are based on whether the proposed exercise of state power amounted to regulation.
7. A state statute would be constitutional, it was said, if enacted in pursuance of valid state powers, if it did not conflict with acts of Congress,
and if It were not designed to regulate interstate commerce. City of New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 137, 9 L.Ed. 648, 662 (1837).
8. ". . . The power to regulate commerce embraces ...
exceedingly various
subjects . . . some . . . demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally
on the commerce of the United States in every part; and, some . . . as imperatively demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities." Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 U.S. 299, 319, 13 L.Ed. 996, 1005 (1852).
9. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103, 23 L.Ed. 818, 820 (1874); Ficklin
v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 145 U.S. 1, 24, 12 S.Ct. 810, 812, 36 L.Ed. 601,
607 (1891); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 193, 45 S.Ct. 481, 483,
69 L.Ed. 909, 912 (1925).
10. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530, 8 S.Ct.
961, 31 L.Ed. 790 (1887); Cleveland, L., C., & St. L. R. Co. v. Black, 154 U.S.
439, 14 S.Ct. 1122, 38 L.Ed. 1041 (1894); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166
U.S. 171, 17 S.Ct. 527, 41 L.Ed. 960 (1896).
11. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 11 S.Ct. 876,
35 L.Ed. 613 (1890); Auduby Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450, 38 S.Ct.
373, 62 L.Ed. 827 (1917).
12. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 S.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715 (1885); Bacon v.
Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 33 S.Ct. 299, 57 L.Ed. 615 (1912); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237 (1922); Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 34, 78 L.Ed. 131 (1933).
13. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 5 S.Ct. 1091, 29 L.Ed. 257 (1884); Pitts-
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been permitted. Agencies of transportation have been forced to
pay state taxes.1 4 The use 5 or storage " of property entered from
other states has been validly subjected to nondiscriminatory state
taxation even though the goods were to be subsequently used in
interstate commerce. 17 At times the nondiscriminatory nature of
the tax was relied upon; 8 but it has been stated that the mere
fact that intrastate commerce bore equal burdens would not
suffice to sustain a statute that is otherwise invalid. 9
The oftentimes repeated demand that interstate commerce
"pay its way" 20 has influenced the gradual qualification of the
immunity of interstate commerce, further limited by the instant
case. The decision reconciles previous cases, which it describes
as predicated on a "practical judgment of the likelihood of the
tax being used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage."' 21 Power to tax may be intrusted to the states so long
as they are not "left free to exert it to the detriment of the national commerce. 2 2 The effect of the tax here is no different from
23
that of other taxes previously sustained.
burgh & So. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 15 S.Ct. 415, 39 L.Ed. 538 (1894);
General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 S.Ct. 475, 52 L.Ed. 754 (1907).
14. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 17 S.Ct. 305,
41 L.Ed. 683 (1896); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U.S. 165, 39 S.Ct. 62,
63 L.Ed. 190 (1918); St. Louis & East St. L. R. v. Missouri, 256 U.S. 314, 41
S.Ct. 488, 65 L.Ed. 946 (1921).
15. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524, 81 L.Ed. 814
(1937); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 59 S.Ct. 376, 83
L.Ed. 488 (1939).
16. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 52 S.Ct. 631, 76 L.Ed. 1232
(1932); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 S.Ct. 345,
77 L.Ed. 730 (1933); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport Co., 289 U.S. 249, 53
S.Ct. 386, 77 L.Ed. 792 (1933).
17. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S.Ct. 389, 83 L.Ed. 586
(1939).
18. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 19 L.Ed. 382 (1868); Hinson v. Lott,
75 U.S. 148, 19 L.Ed. 387 (1868); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 15 S.Ct. 367,
39 L.Ed. 430 (1894); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S. 444, 49 S.Ct. 188,
73 L.Ed. 475 (1928).
19. State Freight Tax Case, 82 U.S. 232, 279, 21 L.Ed. 146 (1872); Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 694 (1886).
20. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259, 39 S.Ct.
265, 266, 63 L.Ed. 590, 594 (1918); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210
U.S. 217, 225, 28 S.Ct. 638, 640, 52 L.Ed. 1031, 1036 (1907); Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254, 58 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823, 827
(1937). See also dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Holmes in New Jersey
Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338, 351, 50 S.Ct. 111,
114, 74 L.Ed. 463, 469 (1929); and concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 253, 49 S.Ct. 279, 281, 73
L.Ed. 683, 688 (1928).
21. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S.Ct. 388, 391, 84
L.Ed. 343, 346, n. 2 (1940).
22. Id. at 393..
23. See cases cited Id. at 394.
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But the emphasis placed on the fact that the taxable event
is the transfer of possession 2' reveals some fear that the decision
may be relied upon to justify taxation of other integral parts,
hence multiple taxation, of the interstate transaction. (This
objection is raised in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes.)

25

Under this decision, could not Pennsylvania, by reason

of the shipment of the coal in that state, also tax gross receipts?
The decision does not answer. If the question arises, the court
might reply either that: (1) Such tax is valid, for the effect of
it is no different from that of other taxes which may be levied
before and after the actual journey across the state borders, subjecting the commerce to the actual possibility of being taxed
many times;2 6 or (2) the tax is invalid, because in the court's
"practical judgment" such as a tax might be used to the detriment of interstate commerce; or because such a tax is levied in
the course of movement, and taxation remains regulation until
movement is about to end;2 7 or because the buyer's state is the
only one that has jurisdiction to tax in the course of an interstate
sale.2 8 The court would not likely welcome the increased dangers

of multiple taxation which would be implicit in the sustaining
of such a levy, and would probably declare the tax invalid.
Another question arises in considering whether, under this
decision, a state might prohibit all traffic in certain articles, if
the prohibition were applied without discrimination. If direct
prohibition is invalid, may the state tax the transfer of "title or
possession" so heavily that use of the article will be, for all practical purposes, prohibited? The broad language and the ruling of
the present case would justify such measures. If that be so, the
court has indirectly overruled prior decisions29 which held unconstitutional the prohibition of sale of goods in original packages.
Other difficulties were encountered by the court. Previous
decisions had intimated that a distinction should be drawn on the
basis of whether or not a movement in interstate commerce was
24. Id. at 394.
25. Id. at 403.
26. See notes 12, 13, 16 and 17, supra.
27. See State Freight Tax Case, 82 U.S. 232, 21 L.Ed. 146 (1872), for an
example of the invalidation of a tax held unconstitutional because levied
in the course of interstate movement.
28. This point is discussed, and authorities are cited in Lockhart, The
Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617.
29. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128 (1889); Lyng
v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 10 S.Ct. 725, 34 L.Ed. 150 (1889); Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 18 S.Ct. 757, 43 L.Ed. 49 (1897).
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contemplated at the time the sale was made.3 ° This distinction
was considered by the court in the instant case and was rejected. 1
The Court proceeded to vitiate the argument that the decision would conflict with previous cases by limiting 2 the rule of
3
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District"
and the cases rely4
ing thereon. Nor did it attach any importance to the fact that
the out-of-state seller must pay the tax. It disposed of the problem by saying that the statute merely imposed on him the duty
of collection. Since measuring the tax in proportion to the gross
proceeds of the interstate sales does not detrimentally affect
interstate commerce,3 6 that too is justifiable.
With this the last barrier is cleared and the sales tax is held
constitutional. By its decision the court further reduces the
bounty of tax exemption previously enjoyed by those who deal
between the states. The ruling does much to equalize the tax
loads of competing businesses, and provides an additional source
of state revenue.
But the case appears to signify more than merely that a sales
tax is constitutional. It apparently enunciates the principle that
any nondiscriminatory taxation of interstate commerce which
is not likely to be used to the detriment of commercial relations
among the states will be upheld.3 7 A state still may not regulate;
but such taxation without discrimination is no longer regulation.
This rule is desirable if it is not allowed to serve as a basis for
veiled re-erection of those barriers to free interstate commercial
relations which the Commerce Clause sought to destroy. That
such would be permitted seems unlikely. And the mere fact
30. See Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405, 412, 28 S.Ct. 526,

528, 52 L.Ed. 855 (1907); Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515, 43
S.Ct. 643, 646, 67 L.Ed. 1095, 1100 (1923). For an example of the absurd consequences to which so artificial a distinction would lead, compare Sear's Roebuck & Co. v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 184, 18 N.E. (2d) 25 (1938) with Com-

pagnie Generalede
(2d) 28 (1938).
31. 60 S.Ct. 388,
32. 60 S.Ct. 388,
33. 120 U.S. 489,

Transatlantique v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 192, 18 N.E.
397, 84 L.Ed. 343, 351, 352 (1940).
398, 84 L.Ed. 343, 352, 353 (1940).
7 S.Ct. 592, 30 L.Ed. 694 (1886). This case ruled that the

negotiation of interstate sales could not be taxed. It

held unconstitutional

a statute imposing a fixed-sum license tax upon a "drummer" who was soliciting interstate sales.
34. Nineteen such cases are listed in the opinion of the Berwind-White
Case, 60 S.Ct. 388, 397, n. 11, 84 L.Ed. 343, 352 (1940).
35. Id.
36. Id.

at 394, n. 9.
at 398.

37. The court states the purpose of the commerce clause to be only 'to
protect interstate commerce from discriminatory or destructive state action."

Id. at 394.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

that interstate commerce must bear a tax load equal to that of
its intrastate competitors should not unduly hamper the negotiation of interstate commercial relations.
A.B.R.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE DURING TRIAL
-REVERSIBLE ERROR-During a recent murder trial a special judge
presided during the impanelling of the jury, and the regular
judge returned to the bench for the remainder of the trial. Defendant was convicted and moved for a new trial. He assigned
as error the substitution of judges. On appeal, held, new trial
refused. The defendant failed to show that his rights were prejudiced by the error. State v. McClain, 194 So. 563 (La. 1940).
, The courts in most states hold that a substitution of judges
at any time after the jury has been accepted and sworn is reversible error.1 Two reasons have been advanced by the courts
in support of this conclusion: (1) the constitutional guaranty of
trial by jury means trial by the identical judge and jury throughout; 2 (2) the practical argument that a judge who is not present
during the entire proceedings will be unable properly to evaluate
the evidence by simply scanning the recordA This latter argument appears to be the more reasonable and is the one most often
advanced by the courts, especially in the recent decisions.
The principal case, however, presents a problem slightly different from that of substitution during the actual trial. The substitution in this case took place after the jury had been sworn
but before any evidence had been produced. The court, although
admitting for purposes of argument the possible irregularity of
the procedure, yet refused to grant a reversal, and based its de4
cision on Article 557 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court appears to
be sound and is in line with the holdings in other jurisdictions.5
1. Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732 (C.C.A. 2d, 1915); Durden v.
People, 192 Ill. 493, 61 N.E. 317 (1901); Mason v. State, 26 Ohio C.C.R. 535, 5
Ohio C.C.R. (N.S.) 113 (1904); Commonwealth v. Claney, 113 Pa. Super. 439, 173
Atl. 840 (1934); People v. McPherson, 74 Hun 336, 26 N.Y. Supp. 236 (1893);
Blend v. People, 41 N.Y. 604 (1870); State v. Finder, 12 S.D. 423, 81 N.W. 959
(1900). Contra: State v. McCray, 189 Iowa 1239, 179 N.W. 627 (1920); People
v. Henderson, 28 Cal. 466 (1865).
2. Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732 (C.C.A. 2d, 1915).
3. Commonwealth v. Claney, 113 Pa. Super. 439, 173 Atl. 840 (1934).
4. See note 7, infra.
5. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 195 Atl. 115, 114 A.L.R. 432

